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Abstract
Based on an extensive international dataset containing Thomson Reuters environmental, social and corporate governance 
(ESG) rating, as well as Thomson Reuters newest controversies and combined score of an average of 2500 companies in 
the years 2002–2018, this article contributes to the existing discourse of the relationship between corporate social perfor-
mance and corporate financial performance (CFP) by examining the Fama and French (J Financ Econ 116(1):1–22, 2015) 
five-factor risk-adjusted performance of positive screened best and worst portfolios, based on a 10% cutoff, respectively, for 
equally, value- and rank-weighted strategies in the European, US and global market. Furthermore, the controversies score 
allows us to examine the mid-to-long-term effects of scandals on the CFP without having to rely on the event study meth-
odology. Even though a value-weighted strategy does not show any significant abnormal returns, we examined a significant 
outperformance for equally weighted worst ESG portfolios and best controversies strategies. These results strongly indicate 
that this is, on the one hand, driven by low-rated smaller companies (“small sinners”) and clean-coated firms with regard to 
controversies (“silent saints”) on the other hand. The findings hold for several robustness checks such as adjusting the cutoff 
rates or splitting the dataset across time.
Keywords ESG · Corporate social responsibility · Corporate social performance · Controversy
Introduction
The interaction between corporate social performance (CSP) 
measured by ESG scores (which evaluate the performance of 
companies in their environmental, social or corporate gov-
ernance pillars) and their corporate financial performance 
(CFP) has been the subject of academic research for many 
years with various findings. This paper is the first to examine 
the mid-to-long-term effects of controversies, as the new 
dimension of ESG, on the CFP of listed companies in a 
portfolio context. Furthermore, it determines the impact of 
different weighting strategies for high- and low-rated ESG 
and controversy portfolios.
Since the 1970, the matter of the relationship between 
CSP and CFP has been investigated by a pile of academic 
research. Revelli and Viviani (2015) report in their recent 
meta-analysis that the consideration of CSP in a portfolio 
leads to neither an under- nor an outperformance when 
compared with non-ESG-based investment strategies. 
Friede et al. (2015) conclude from their meta-analysis that 
approximately 90% of the more than 2000 considered stud-
ies report a nonnegative relationship between CSP and CFP. 
This heterogeneity of the results can generally be ascribed 
to three issues, namely the question of how to measure CSP, 
the methods of stock selection and the question of how to 
define and measure CFP.
Addressing the first concern, some companies like Sus-
tainalytics, MSCI-KLD or Asset4 specialize in issuing an 
ESG-based rating system and represent therefore as external 
and independent rating providers a transparent and reliable 
source of objective corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
measurements. Nevertheless, Capelle-Blancard and Monjon 
(2012) as well as Revelli and Viviani (2015) argue that the 
academic discordance can mainly be ascribed to the factor 
of data-driven results. Furthermore, Dorfleitner et al. (2015) 
and Chatterji et al. (2016) report a lack of homogeneous 
ESG measurement concepts, even among the large interna-
tional ESG rating institutions.
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To address the CSP measurement issue, our analysis 
includes three distinct ratings that represent industry-based 
percentile-ranked scores, which enable a simple imple-
mentation of a best-in-class approach and therefore do not 
discriminate any industry groups. The first one, the Thom-
son Reuters ESG score (in the following referred to as TR 
score), evaluates the CSR in various pillars, the Thomson 
Reuters Controversies score (in the following referred to 
as controversies score) measures the amount of ESG-based 
controversies a company encounters during a fiscal year, and 
finally, the Thomson Reuters combined score (in the follow-
ing referred to as combined score) aggregates ESG-related 
controversies and the TR score of a company.
Despite the fact that the controversies score finds its 
application within other financial research [see, for exam-
ple, Park (2018) and Vasilescu and Wisniewski (2019)], we 
still contribute to the literature as we are the first ones to 
consider the extreme event of an ESG-based scandal within 
the context of portfolio selection.
The heterogeneity of academic results is strengthened 
even further by the use of various stock selection criteria. 
The most common and easy way in which an investor can 
implement a socially responsible investment (SRI) strategy 
is represented by socially responsible (SR) mutual funds. 
These funds claim to construct a portfolio based on SR selec-
tion criteria, such as selecting stocks with a high ESG rating 
(positive screening) or excluding the so-called sin stocks 
(tobacco, alcohol, arms or gambling industry) from their 
investment decisions (negative screening). The majority of 
the literature devoted to these type of investment strategies 
reports on no financial performance differences between 
SR and conventional mutual funds (see, i.e., Statman 2000; 
Bauer et al. 2005; Bello 2005; Kreander et al. 2005; Cortez 
et al. 2009; Utz and Wimmer 2014). However, socially or 
ethically motivated value-driven investors in particular have 
to pay close attention to the shifting level of social respon-
sibility of these SR funds. Wimmer (2013) finds that these 
funds are optimized towards their financial rather than their 
social performance and therefore the overall level of social 
performance of an SR fund is only persistent in the short 
run. Utz and Wimmer (2014) argue that, viewed from an 
individual stock level, neither SR mutual funds nor conven-
tional funds differ greatly in terms of portfolio composition. 
This leads to the conclusion that SR mutual funds do not 
sustainably satisfy the needs of value-driven investors.
To overcome the stock selection problem, our analysis 
does not include SR funds, but rather selects stocks based 
on an ESG-ranking, allowing us to measure the CSR of a 
firm directly and therefore constructs long-term ESG-per-
sistent portfolios by implementing a monthly rebalanced 
positive screening process following the ESG-based port-
folio formation method of Kempf and Osthoff (2007). We 
construct a best and worst portfolio based on 10% cutoffs 
for ESG and controversy out- and underperformer in the 
sample, respectively. Additionally, the best-minus-worst 
zero-cost-investment strategy simply buys the outperform-
ers and short sells the underperformers. Besides testing for 
the standard approach of value-weighted portfolios, we also 
conduct equally weighted ones to better control for dispari-
ties between large and small firms. Furthermore, we imple-
ment a ranked weighting, which, given an ESG-based stock 
selection, allocates a higher weight to the respective stock 
the more extreme its score becomes.
Regarding the definition and measurement of CFP, 
researchers tend to use methods of two different directions. 
Whereas the first group, which represents an accounting-
based view, defines CFP as the shift in earnings per share 
(EPS), operating profitability [return on equity (ROE), return 
on assets (ROA) or return on sales (ROS)] or net income, 
the second employs a stock-market-oriented perspective by 
applying (risk-adjusted) performance measurements such as 
abnormal returns, Sharpe Ratio or Tobin’s Q. A common 
method in the accounting-based direction comprises the 
implementation of a particular type of regression analysis. 
Qiu et al. (2016), for instance, regress the ROS of companies 
on their respective ESG score. Mervelskemper and Streit 
(2017) follow the valuation approach of Ohlson (1995) and 
add an ESG dimension to the model resulting in a regres-
sion of the market-to-book value of equity ratio on an ESG 
score. Van der Laan et al. (2008) implement a firm-fixed-
effects regression to measure the influence of different CSP 
rating dimensions on the ROA and the EPS. In the stock-
market-based perspective, factor models represent a com-
mon way in which to measure CFP as they have evolved 
from simple single-index models (like the CAPM) into a 
more appropriate approach like the Fama and French (2015) 
five-factor model. Kempf and Osthoff (2007) and Halbritter 
and Dorfleitner (2015), for example, align themselves in this 
group by implementing a Carhart (1997) four-factor model 
to estimate the abnormal returns of ESG portfolios. With a 
Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression, Halbritter and Dor-
fleitner (2015) also incorporate a cross-sectional approach 
as they regress the excess return of a certain company on 
its ESG score. Pintekova and Kukacka (2019) analyze the 
share prices of companies based on the Thomson Reuters 
combined score using a within-group fixed-effects model. 
Aouadi and Marsat (2018) utilize a fixed-effects model 
with dummy variables to estimate the relationship between 
Tobins’ Q and an ESG score. Other studies, such as Auer 
(2016) and Auer and Schuhmacher (2016) who implement a 
Sharpe Ratio approach, rely on financial ratios. Event studies 
represent another noteworthy methodology, which is espe-
cially useful when analyzing the short-term impact of certain 
events (for example, the eventuation of a scandal). Among 
others, Lundgren and Olsson (2009) examine the effects of 
environmental-based scandals on firm value by applying a t 
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test to the cumulative standardized abnormal return, whereas 
Krüger (2015) utilizes the cumulative abnormal return to 
show the impact of positive and negative ESG-related news 
separately on firm value. As these examples show, there is 
a wide variety of different methods and models for different 
purposes. A more stock-market-oriented perspective is espe-
cially suitable for an analysis from an investor’s perspective 
as these methods better reflect the investors’ perception of 
the impact of CSR on the future value of the company (see, 
i.e., Hillman and Keim 2001; Gentry and Shen 2010; Pinte-
kova and Kukacka 2019). Therefore, we align with the stock-
market-oriented perspective and use the Fama and French 
(2015) five-factor model to calculate the risk-adjusted abnor-
mal return. Furthermore, the use of the controversy score 
allows us to directly measure the mid-to-long-term effects 
of controversies on CFP without having to rely on the event 
study methodology.
Besides the academic disjointedness, SRI strategies have 
received a rapid rise in interest over the recent years. The 
global AUM, according to the Global Sustainable Invest-
ment Review GSIA (2018), grew significantly from 22.89$ 
trillion in 2016 to 30.68$ trillion in 2018, whereas, as 
reported by the U.S. Forum for Sustainable and Respon-
sible Investments USSIF (2018), the AUM experienced a 
sharp increase from $8.7 trillion in 2016 to $12.0 trillion 
at the beginning of 2018 in the US market alone, which 
shows an almost 40% growth over two years. Furthermore, 
as mentioned by Crilly et al. (2012), the increasing pressure 
provided by various stakeholder groups forces companies to 
invest financial resources in CSR. Moreover, many investors 
pay close attention to the CSR or CSP of firms, whether 
they be value-driven investors trying to satisfy their altruistic 
needs or attempting to achieve abnormal returns by investing 
in firms with high ESG ratings.
Interestingly, within our results, we find a significant out-
performance of up to almost 9 % p.a. for the worst TR score 
portfolios for equally weighted strategies as well as 7 % p.a. 
for the equally weighted best controversies score portfolios. 
These results show that investors should focus on low-rated 
smaller companies (“small sinners”) and clean-coated firms 
with regard to controversies (“silent saints”). The imple-
mentation of a rank-weighted strategy instead of an equally 
weighted one shows an improvement in alpha across nearly 
all tested strategies. Regarding the value-weighted strategies, 
no significant out- or underperformance can be found. These 
findings apply for different markets and hold true for various 
robustness checks.
This paper is organized as follows. “Literature overview” 
section provides a short overview of the recent state of lit-
erature, while the data and methodology are discussed in 
“Data and methodology” section. “Results” section presents 
our results.  “Robustness checks” section implements several 
robustness checks, and “Conclusion” section concludes.
Literature overview
This section provides an overview of the three perspectives 
regarding the relationship between CSP and CFP.
The first one indicates a positive relationship between 
the ESG score of a company and their respective CFP 
(see, i.e., Kempf and Osthoff 2007; Statman and Glush-
kov 2009; Auer 2016; Pintekova and Kukacka 2019) and 
is often referred to as doing good while doing well. This 
hypothesis holds true if the costs of socially responsible 
activities are overestimated or the respective benefits 
exceed the expectations of the managers and investors. 
This can be explained through the managerial myopia the-
ory (see, i.e., Narayanan 1985; Stein 1988), where, on the 
one hand, managers tend to prefer decisions with a short-
term profit rather than those that maximize long-term 
shareholder value, and short-term focused investors, on the 
other hand, who undervalue long-term benefits. Since the 
costs of socially responsible activities occur immediately, 
the benefits of those arise in the future. Therefore, the cor-
responding benefits are harder to predict and less attractive 
to short-term focused investors. Among others, Derwall 
et al. (2005) and Edmans (2011), who link the doing good 
while doing well-hypothesis with the managerial myopia 
theory, conclude that short-term investors are unable (or 
unwilling) to price the long-term benefits of those activi-
ties correctly and therefore undervalue stocks of compa-
nies with high levels of engagement in environmental or 
social aspects, leading to higher returns in the long-run for 
the respective stocks when compared with other stocks. 
This idea of benefit manifestation in the long run is con-
sistent with the findings of Dorfleitner et al. (2018), who 
conclude that the benefits of socially responsible activities 
(measured by the abnormal stock returns) are produced by 
unexpected additional cash flows which occur mid-to-long 
term. Pintekova and Kukacka (2019) divide the term of 
ESG-based activities into a primary and a secondary sec-
tor, whereas the first category refers to socially responsible 
activities which are closely related to the core business of 
the respective company. They can corroborate within their 
results, the point of view of doing good while doing well 
if the ESG-based activity is located in the primary sector.
The second approach reverts the above-mentioned 
relationship, which produces a view of doing good but 
not well (see, i.e., Boyle et al. 1997; Barnea and Rubin 
2010; Renneboog et  al. 2008; Hong and Kacperczyk 
2009). This hypothesis holds true for many reasons. First 
of all, based on the idea of Barnea and Rubin (2010), 
socially responsible activities that represent lavish expen-
ditures of managers motivated by personal benefits, such 
as public appreciation rather than the altruistic motive 
of non-financial utility, lead to a significant decrease in 
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shareholder value and inferior financial performance. 
Thus, an agency problem occurs. As described by Krüger 
(2015), investors will react negatively (positively) to the 
announcement of socially responsible activities of firms 
with a high (low) amount of liquidity and can therefore be 
seen as wasteful investments. Furthermore, as stated by 
Heinkel et al. (2001) and Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), 
socially responsible investors and institutions which 
are subjected to social norm pressures (such as pension 
funds, universities and religious organizations) exclude 
“sin stocks” from their investment decisions resulting in a 
lower demand, respectively, price and therefore a higher 
return in comparison with stocks which have a high ESG 
rating. Another reason supporting the doing good but not 
well-hypothesis is the trade-off theory stated by Aupperle 
et al. (1985). In the case of socially responsible invest-
ments, the theory argues that ESG-based activities exhaust 
financial resources which are lacking in other places. 
Thus, companies with a low level of expenditure on CSR 
achieve a competitive advantage in the long run, which 
may be especially relevant for smaller firms who are on a 
tighter budget. For small companies, the trade-off theory 
is strengthened even further by the findings of Aouadi and 
Marsat (2018). Since they examine the connection between 
firm visibility, CSP and CFP they conclude that only for 
high-attention firms (firms that are larger, more present in 
the media and more greatly observed by analysts), the ESG 
rating plays a role. In conclusion, if smaller firms invest 
in CSR, this could be seen as a waste of precious financial 
resources and therefore reduce firm value.
A third view suggests that there is no clear positive or 
negative relationship between the CSP and the CFP of a 
firm. Among others, the recent studies of Halbritter and 
Dorfleitner (2015) and Auer and Schuhmacher (2016) indi-
cate that there is no statistical difference in the risk-adjusted 
returns of a portfolio consisting of either high ESG-rated or 
low ESG-rated firms. This third point of view does not nec-
essarily conclude the absence of a connection between CSP 
and CFP but may, in contrast, on the one hand, indicate that 
the market prices CSP properly which leads to an absence of 
risk-adjusted returns, or, on the other hand, that the benefits 
resulting from the ESG-based activities will be offset by 
their respective drawbacks such as, for example, their costs 
or the occurrence of agency problems.
Whatever the relationship between CFP and CSP reveals 
itself to be in a specific context, the question of informational 
efficient markets still arises. As the stock selection of cor-
responding investment strategies is frequently based on the 
evaluation of certain ESG-based ratings, one may argue, as 
these scores are publicly available, that financially motivated 
investors could not generate a risk-adjusted excess return over 
conventional or non-ESG-based investments, due to of market 
efficiency. Fama (1965, (1970) describes, with the efficient 
market hypothesis (EMH), a framework in which, if the semi-
strong form holds true, all information regarding the CSR of a 
company such as sustainability reports, ESG ratings and even 
ESG-based scandals should be correctly incorporated into the 
price of the respective stock shortly after being made public. 
Therefore, an outperformance of an ESG-based stock selection 
strategy would not be possible. However, Grossman (1976) 
and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), for example, argue that a 
perfect information-efficient market could not exist, as there 
would be no incentive for investors to gather information or 
to actively manage a portfolio whatsoever, because they could 
not generate any excess returns.
In the case of SRI, Mynhardt et al. (2017) examine the effi-
ciency of socially responsible indices by calculating a Hurst 
coefficient. The results indicate that most socially responsible 
indices are significantly less efficient than conventional ones. 
With a few exceptions, the Hurst coefficient of most of these 
indices differs from an efficient market (where the Hurst coef-
ficient would be exactly 0.5), ranging either from 0.3 to 0.45 
(signaling fat tails with an anti-persistent return series which 
is negatively correlated) or from 0.55 to 0.6 (indicating fat tails 
with a tendency to persistent return series with a slight positive 
correlation), which raises the question of whether ESG-based 
information is priced immediately and correctly and is con-
sidered in its entirety. This appears to be especially crucial in 
terms of ESG-based scandals as, whereas the occurrence of a 
scandal is publicly perceived and indeed undoubtedly imme-
diately priced, the impact of the absence of these scandals has 
often been overlooked as companies with a low amount of 
scandals “fly under the radar”. In this regard, the controversy 
score represents a good opportunity to decrease this ineffi-
ciency and can add significant value to ESG investing as this 
score is comparable to credit default ratings as these ratings 
also evaluate the absence of an infrequent event. Dorfleitner 
et al. (2018) also address the aspect of information inefficiency 
in the context of SRI as they argue that the future financial 
benefits of socially responsible activities are not immediately 
perceivable and therefore the economic nature of CSR remains 
fairly opaque. Within their results, they conclude that ESG-
based activities lead to significant earnings surprises and unex-
pected additional cashflows in the long run. Edmans (2011) 
proves something similar with respect to the intangible asset 
of being one of the best companies to work for, due to the 
particularly good of their employees.
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Data and methodology
Data
Due to their transparent scoring methodology, we choose 
Thomson Reuters1 as the world’s largest ESG rating data-
base for our data source (see, i.e., Cheng et al. 2014; Durand 
and Jacqueminet 2015). Therefore, our dataset includes all 
Thomson Reuters scores (in the following referred to as TR 
scores), controversies and combined scores for the Euro-
pean, US, as well as the global market (including the US 
and European market) in the period under review from 2002 
to 2018. These three scores represent the starting point for 
further calculations and are explained in more detail below.
First, the controversies scores, which pertain to Thomson 
Reuter’s latest scoring methodology, add a new dimension 
to previous approaches by capturing negative media stories 
from global media sources. This score is a percentile ranking 
that takes ESG-based scandals into account concerning and 
infringing on any of the following controversy topics and 
that occur during a company’s fiscal year. Its rating method-
ology consists of 23 ESG controversy topics such as “con-
troversies privacy” or “business ethics controversies” (see 
Thomson Reuters 2019). This score is also benchmarked on 
the respective industry groups.
Thus, if a scandal occurs, it has a negative impact on 
the evaluation of the company involved. Ongoing legisla-
tion disputes, lawsuits and fines may also affect the ensuing 
years and may still be visible in further controversy ratings. 
Furthermore, the valuation is as follows:
In brief: the fewer scandals that affect a company, the higher 
its score is.2
The TR score evaluates a company’s environmental, 
social and corporate governance performance (ESG) with 
regard to ten main categories based on publicly avail-
able company-reported data. Each of these categories (for 
instance, resource use, innovation and emissions in the envi-
ronmental pillar, human rights and workforce in the social 
pillar and management in the corporate governance pillar) 
receives an individually calculated category score and a 
related category weighting within its associated pillar. These 
data result in three so-called pillar scores, one for each ESG 
pillar. To calculate the overall ESG score, these pillar scores 
(1)
score
=
# comp.with aworse value +
# comp.with the same value included current one
2
# comp.with a value
are aggregated3 and in the last step, the TR score is ranked 
by percentile and benchmarked against the industry. There-
fore, the TR score implies an easy way to implement a best-
in-class approach (see Thomson Reuters 2019).
Next, the combined score comprises both the TR and 
the controversies score and thus offers a broadly diversi-
fied scoring with regard to performance-based ESG data 
and controversies collected from worldwide media sources 
(see Thomson Reuters 2019). The controversies score has no 
impact on the TR score if it is greater than or equal to 50. In 
this case, the combined score equals the TR score. However, 
if the TR score is less than the controversies score, the com-
bined score also equals the TR score. Only if the TR score 
is greater than the controversies score ( < 50 ), the combined 
score equals the average of both scores.4
In order to determine our data universe, we only consider 
companies for which all three ratings are present. Moreover, 
penny stocks are deleted. As a result, we obtain a monthly-
based dataset with over 529,000 observations in total at an 
average of approximately 2500 companies in a single month 
during our time period of 2002–2018 (192 months), more 
precisely between 900 and 4700 at each point in time. For 
all observed companies, we have a comparable dataset of 
the three ratings (TR, combined and controversies). Table 1 
shows the descriptive statistics of our data universe.
Concerning the TR rating, the mean value of the rating 
universe corresponds almost exactly to 50 with a standard 
deviation of approximately 17. The controversies score is 
approximately the same as the TR score in terms of mean 
value and standard deviation. As can be expected with regard 
to the calculation, the combined score has a lower mean 
value than the TR and controversies score with a standard 
deviation of 15.
Regarding the correlation between the three scores it 
is noteworthy that the correlation between the controver-
sies score and the TR score is negative (− 0.3107). Thus, 
Table 1  Descriptive statistics
This table presents the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maxi-
mum values of the TR, controversies and combined scores of the full 
dataset
Score Mean SD Min Max
TR 50.58 16.86 5.16 97.51
Controversies 49.49 20.27 0.08 90.91
Combined 45.46 15.51 5.16 95.22
1 The scores are currently published by Refinitiv.
2 For more detailed information on the calculation, see Thomson 
Reuters (2019).
3 The weightings of the three pillars are 34% for the environmental, 
35.5% for the social and 30.5% for the governance pillar.
4 For more detailed information on the calculation, see Thomson 
Reuters (2019).
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companies with a high TR score tend to have a low contro-
versies score.
One explanation for this may be that companies that tend 
to have high ESG scores are affected more greatly by con-
troversies, as reflected by the saying “the higher you fly, the 
harder you fall”.
Furthermore, as would be expected from the composi-
tion, the correlation between TR score and combined score 
is positive (0.7774) as well as between controversies score 
and combined score (0.3077).
The analysis in this paper is carried out from the per-
spective of an US investor, so all data is converted into US 
dollars. The total returns and market capitalization of the 
considered companies are received from Thomson Reuters 
Eikon. Discarded (delisted) or insolvent companies are con-
sidered until the last available rating or financial informa-
tion. Thus, our results are not influenced by a potential sur-
vivorship bias. For more detailed insights, some descriptives 
for the European and US market are displayed in Table 2. 
While for the European market we consider over 158,000 
observations based on an average of approximately 820 
companies (between 400 and 1000), for the US market, our 
data consist of over 191,000 observations at an average of 
approximately 1000 companies (between 400 and 2300).
Methodology
As a first step, we construct several portfolios by generally 
sorting stocks according to each score. To calculate the 
monthly returns, we select the best-rated and worst-rated 
stocks, respectively, and combine them in a portfolio, one 
being for each of the three scores. Following this procedure, 
we consider a best-only and worst-only strategy as well as a 
best-minus-worst strategy, which is long in the best-perform-
ing companies and short in the worst-performing ones. As a 
next step, we consider three different weighting approaches 
upon which to construct the portfolios. We include the com-
mon value-weighted and equally weighted strategies and 
also a rank-weighted strategy that we present in detail below 
in “A different approach: rank-weighted portfolios” section.
We obtain nine stock portfolios5 for value- and equally 
weighted and rank-weighted strategies, which is the object 
of contemplation in “Rank-weighted portfolios” section, 
respectively, in the European, US and global market—in 
total 27 per market. In order to determine the performance 
of our portfolios, we apply the Fama and French (2015) five-
factor model, which is based on the regression:
In this model, the return of portfolio i for period t is repre-
sented by R
it
 while R
Ft
 comprises the risk-free return. R
Mt
 
denotes the return of the market portfolio, SMB
t
 represents 
the small-minus-big factor (returns of small stocks minus 
returns of big stocks) and HML
t
 is the performance differ-
ence between companies with a high and low book-to-mar-
ket value. The factor RMW
t
 indicates the difference between 
the returns of stocks with a weak and a robust profitability. 
CMA
t
 describes the returns of conservative (i.e., low-invest-
ment firms) minus aggressive (i.e., high-investment firms) 
stocks. Moreover, b
i
, s
i
, h
i
, r
i
 , and c
i
 are the estimated regres-
sion coefficients which are calculated by OLS regression, in 
which e
it
 denotes a (zero-mean) residual and a
i
 the intercept.
Since a Breusch and Pagan (1979) test applied to all port-
folios indicates that the residuals of the regressions are sub-
ject of heteroskedasticity and a Godfrey (1978) and Breusch 
(1978) test as well as a Durbin and Watson (1971) test show 
autocorrelations for most of the models, we use the approach 
of Newey and West (1987) to calculate standard errors.
A different approach: rank‑weighted portfolios
Besides equally weighted and value-weighted portfolios, 
we also consider a new portfolio composition strategy fol-
lowing a similar approach to Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) 
which reflects the great importance of the ESG ratings for 
those investors, who may wish to award a different level in 
the scores through a corresponding weight. Consequently, 
we build portfolio weights based on the respective score 
placements. Our new approach is to award better scores 
and to consequently include them with higher weights in 
(2)
R
it
− R
Ft
= a
i
+ b
i
(R
Mt
− R
Ft
) + s
i
SMB
t
+ h
i
HML
t
+ r
i
RMW
t
+ c
i
CMA
t
+ e
it
.
Table 2  Descriptive statistics 
for the European and US market
This table presents the mean, standard deviation and number of observations of the TR, controversies and 
combined scores of the European and US datasets
Score Europe USA
Mean SD Observations Mean SD Observations
TR 56.64 15.99 158,248 48.15 16.05 191,661
Controversies 48.36 21.24 158,248 46.53 21.91 191,661
Combined 50.30 15.50 158,248 42.08 14.03 191,661
5 This results from three different scores and three different portfolio 
sets.
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a best-portfolio strategy and vice versa in order to reward 
worse scores with higher weights in the worst portfolio. 
In addition, the best portfolios constructed this way have, 
by definition, a higher ESG rating than value-weighted or 
equally weighted strategies, whereas the worst portfolios 
have lower ratings. First, we determine the best and worst 
stocks. Next, we divide the companies up by rank in ascend-
ing and descending order. In the best portfolios, the company 
with the highest score receives the (numerically) highest 
rank. In contrast, the company with the worst score receives 
the highest rank in the worst portfolios. To calculate the 
weights w
i,t of a company c ∈ Ct ⊆ C , where C is the set of 
all companies within the respective data and C
t
 is the set of 
all companies within the portfolio at time t, we use
and for each t ∈ T  there holds
where Rk
t
(c) note the rank of a company c at t, N
t
= |C
t
| 
the cardinality of the portfolio selection at t, in the monthly 
period under review. If a company ĉ ∈ C�C
t
 does not appear 
in the portfolio selection at time t by definition, its weight is
Results
Equally and value‑weighted portfolios
Table  3 presents some measures of all 27 equally weighted 
10% portfolio strategies. Concerning the Sharpe ratio, the 
Sortino ratio and the Treynor ratio, it is noteworthy that all 
controversies best and TR worst portfolios show higher val-
ues than the respective market portfolio, which is a first indi-
cation that the performance of these portfolios is high. Fur-
thermore, most best and worst portfolios have a higher risk 
than their respective market in terms of maximum drawdown 
(MDD), while the controversies best-minus-worst portfolios 
have a much lower risk in all three markets. Additionally, 
the MDD is lower than that of the corresponding market 
for the following portfolios: combined best-minus-worst 
(US, global), controversies best (Europe, global), TR worst 
(global) and combined worst (European).
To examine a potential over-performance of the strate-
gies in more detail, we consider the alphas of the respec-
tive portfolios. The results of the Fama and French (2015) 
w
t
∶ C
t
× T⟶ [0, 1]
(c, t)⟼ w
t
(c, t) =
(N
t
− Rk
t
(c)) + 1∑
c̃∈Ct
Rk
t
(c̃)
∑
c̃∈Ct
w
t
(c̃, t) = 1,
w
t
(ĉ, t) ∶= 0.
five-factor regressions are presented in Table 4 for equally 
weighted portfolios and in Table 5 for value-weighted port-
folios. Some results immediately catch the eye: Regarding 
the equally weighted strategy, the worst portfolios based on 
the TR and combined scores, as well as the best portfolios 
of the controversies score, indicate positive and significant 
outperformance. For the controversies score best portfolios, 
consistently positive and significant alphas can be observed 
for all portfolios. These portfolios show strongly significant 
returns of up to almost 7% p.a.6 In contrast to this, the con-
troversies score worst and best-minus-worst portfolios do 
not exhibit any striking features.
Surprisingly, when considering combined score portfo-
lios, a best portfolio strategy does not lead to a significant 
performance. However, the performance of the worst port-
folio shows a consistently strong and significant outper-
formance of up to about 7.6% p.a., which can be observed 
in all three markets. As a result of this, the calculations indi-
cate a significant underperformance of the best-minus-worst 
portfolios. Therefore, this effect cannot be caused by the 
controversies score, but instead appears to be determined 
by the second component of the combined score, namely 
the TR score.
When taking a closer look at the ESG portfolios, we 
notice the following. While the performance of the best 
portfolios—apart from a slight significance in the global 
market—does not show any over-performance, a strongly 
significant outperformance of up to almost 9% ( 8.86% ) p.a. 
can be observed for the worst TR score portfolios in all three 
markets. These results resemble those of the combined score 
portfolios.
On the contrary, we compare this with the results of the 
value-weighted portfolios in Table 5. Apart from very few 
exceptions neither best nor worst portfolios based on the 
three ratings obtain any ongoing positive and significant 
alphas within the European, US or global market. So, it 
becomes relatively clear that there are no ongoing tenden-
cies recognizable in terms of any benefits of best or worst 
strategies. Apart from some isolated outliers, the results lead 
us to the assumption that the value-weighted strategy does 
not result in any excess return for investors, which is consist-
ent with the findings of Halbritter and Dorfleitner (2015). 
It should also be pointed out that the adjusted R2 values of 
all long and short portfolios are consistently high, which 
indicates a strong explanatory power of our underlying fac-
tor model.
There is a clearly recognizable difference between 
Tables 4 and 5: since the results of the value-weighted 
and the equally weighted portfolios are very distinct, this 
6 The annualized performance of the global controversies score best 
portfolio is: 1.005612 − 1 = 0.0693.
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points to the fact that the significant outperformance of 
the equally weighted portfolios is strongly driven by the 
small companies. In particular, the TR portfolios support 
the above finding as the equally weighted portfolios based 
on low TR scores achieve strong outperformance. These 
results provide some evidence of the trade-off hypothesis 
(see Aupperle et al. 1985), as investors appear to reward 
smaller companies for not investing their money in ESG 
Table 3  Measures for equally 
weighted 10% portfolios
This table shows the maximum drawdown (MDD), skewness, kurtosis (excess), Sharpe ratio, Sortino 
ratio and Treynor ratio for portfolios from 2002 to 2018. The variables are calculated individually for each 
equally weighted portfolio based on a 10% cutoff of each score, market and portfolio set as well as for the 
respective total market
MDD Skewness Kurtosis Sharpe ratio Sortino ratio Treynor ratio
Europe
 TR
  Best 0.6245 −  0.3056 1.5780 0.3476 0.1939 0.0687
  Worst 0.6387 −  0.3815 1.8294 0.6442 0.3244 0.1287
  Best–worst 0.6213 −  0.2553 0.8853 −  0.9329 −  0.3059 −  1.9748
 Controversies
  Best 0.5696 −  0.4338 2.0089 0.6817 0.3352 0.1363
  Worst 0.6414 −  0.2846 1.9547 0.2721 0.1636 0.0542
  Best–worst 0.1652 −  0.6429 2.6383 0.4591 0.2070 −  0.1891
 Combined
  Best 0.6213 −  0.5126 2.0035 0.3854 0.2065 0.0760
  Worst 0.5696 −  0.4055 2.1586 0.4544 0.2401 0.0916
  Best–worst 0.6414 −  0.3854 0.8504 −  0.4932 −  0.1628 0.9960
 Market 0.5903 −  0.6565 1.7155 0.3521 0.1818 0.0650
USA
 TR
  Best 0.5112 − 0.3836 3.1051 0.4932 0.2452 0.0787
  Worst 0.5119 − 0.2851 2.5200 0.6032 0.3043 0.0985
  Best–worst 0.5458 − 0.5538 2.6846 − 0.7360 − 0.2448 0.3503
 Controversies
  Best 0.5320 − 0.1696 1.8906 0.6769 0.3428 0.1121
  Worst 0.5571 − 0.1891 2.8373 0.4623 0.2403 0.0745
  Best–worst 0.1529 0.5305 1.6073 0.3448 0.1798 − 2.3288
 Combined
  Best 0.5137 − 0.2660 3.4409 0.5532 0.2790 0.0899
  Worst 0.5710 − 0.2159 2.6147 0.5870 0.2987 0.0957
  Best–worst 0.3712 − 0.1706 2.2610 − 0.4897 − 0.1711 0.3478
 Market 0.5039 − 0.6927 1.6337 0.4783 0.2238 0.0687
Global
 TR
  Best 0.5591 − 0.4751 2.3367 0.4776 0.2395 0.0760
  Worst 0.5259 − 0.3081 2.5068 0.7753 0.3793 0.1266
  Best–worst 0.6416 − 0.7139 2.5614 − 1.0850 − 0.3442 − 8.5105
 Controversies
  Best 0.5136 − 0.4776 2.3364 0.7892 0.3774 0.1273
  Worst 0.6084 − 0.4332 2.5499 0.3906 0.2038 0.0631
  Best–worst 0.1201 0.1383 1.3355 0.4274 0.2139 − 0.1457
 Combined
  Best 0.5676 − 0.5478 2.9513 0.5282 0.2598 0.0840
  Worst 0.5637 − 0.2991 2.6915 0.6707 0.3313 0.1094
  Best–worst 0.4704 − 0.7383 3.1132 − 0.7641 − 0.2549 2.3499
 Market 0.5363 − 0.8494 2.4412 0.4457 0.2094 0.0670
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improvements. They may consider this spending as a 
wasteful investment and prefer companies that invest in 
growth and innovation. As no or even negative significant 
results were shown for value-weighted best portfolios, we 
can conclude that, for large companies, the benefits of 
expenditures improving CSP are already reflected in the 
stock price of these companies.
Table 4  Equally weighted 10% portfolios: regressions based on the three observed markets
This table shows the results of the Fama and French (2015) five-factor regression for portfolios from 2002 to 2018 on a monthly basis. The 
regressions are calculated individually for each equally weighted portfolio based on a 10% cutoff of each score, market and portfolio set. The 
best (worst) portfolios consist of the 10% best (worst) rated companies regarding a particular score. The best–worst portfolios are long in the 
best-performing companies and short in the worst-performing ones. Monthly alphas, all estimated coefficients of the five Fama and French 
(2015) factors and adj. R2 are reported upon. In order to estimate standard errors, we use the Newey and West (1987) procedure
***, ** and * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%
Alpha MKT SMB HML RMW CMA Adj. R2
Europe
 TR
  Best 0.0016 1.0530*** − 0.2484*** 0.3284** − 0.0451 − 0.1075 0.8843
  Worst 0.0048*** 1.0084*** 0.4390*** 0.3637** − 0.1765 − 0.2130 0.8831
  Best–worst − 0.0043*** 0.0464 − 0.6822*** − 0.0463 0.1297 0.1104 0.3869
 Controversies
  Best 0.0049*** 0.9926*** 0.2184*** − 0.0461 − 0.0545 0.0385 0.8546
  Worst 0.0020 1.0651 − 0.0946 0.2418 − 0.3835* − 0.3656* 0.8699
  Best–worst 0.0020 − 0.0706** 0.3181*** − 0.2990** 0.3272* 0.4090*** 0.3312
 Combined
  Best 0.0004 1.0816*** − 0.0010 0.3257** 0.1577 − 0.0421 0.8845
  Worst 0.0035* 1.0448*** 0.3742*** 0.2493 − 0.3092* − 0.4445* 0.8567
  Best–worst − 0.004** 0.0387 − 0.3700*** 0.0654 0.4652*** 0.4073** 0.1987
USA
 TR
  Best 0.0017 1.0964*** 0.0786 0.2128*** − 0.0770 − 0.2334 0.8192
  Worst 0.0044*** 1.1448*** 0.5243*** 0.3307*** − 0.0966 − 0.5281*** 0.8341
  Best–worst − 0.0037*** − 0.0446 − 0.4440*** − 0.1228** 0.0231 0.2694 0.3687
 Controversies
  Best 0.0049** 1.0739*** 0.4290*** 0.1796* − 0.1431 − 0.3313* 0.7881
  Worst 0.0019 1.1495*** 0.1577* 0.3112*** − 0.0437 − 0.3660 0.8151
  Best–worst 0.0020 − 0.0718 0.2730*** − 0.1364* − 0.0963 0.0390 0.0828
 Combined
  Best 0.0019 1.1568*** 0.3669*** 0.3015*** 0.1347 − 0.3785* 0.8233
  Worst 0.0045*** 1.1546*** 0.4696*** 0.3720*** − 0.1067 − 0.6109*** 0.8341
  Best–worst − 0.0035*** 0.0060 − 0.1009 − 0.0754 0.2445*** 0.2370** 0.1165
Global
 TR
  Best 0.0025* 1.1249*** − 0.0934 0.1997** − 0.3808*** − 0.0858 0.9011
  Worst 0.0071*** 1.0647*** 0.3075*** 0.1991 − 0.4761*** − 0.4157 0.8664
  Best–worst − 0.0056*** 0.0633** − 0.3911*** − 0.0117 0.1004 0.3381 0.1669
 Controversies
  Best 0.0056*** 0.9958*** 0.2406*** 0.1073 − 0.3080*** − 0.1590 0.8772
  Worst 0.0022 1.1654*** − 0.0865 0.2515 − 0.4790*** − 0.2810 0.8737
  Best–worst 0.0023* − 0.1666*** 0.3369*** − 0.1565 0.1761 0.1302 0.2535
 Combined
  Best 0.0020 1.1496*** 0.0970 0.2779*** − 0.1339 − 0.1500 0.9010
  Worst 0.0061*** 1.0859*** 0.2420*** 0.2294* − 0.4990*** − 0.4516* 0.8645
  Best–worst − 0.0051*** 0.0668** − 0.1353* 0.0361 0.3701*** 0.3099*** 0.0887
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Looking at the data, it becomes apparent that an equally 
weighted portfolio strategy based on a high controver-
sies score leads to a high outperformance. Therefore, this 
demonstrates that small companies in particular generate 
a sustained stock performance if they have a “clean coat” 
with regard to controversies. Thus, one might say that they 
“fly under the radar”.
Table 5  Value-weighted 10% portfolios: regressions based on the three observed markets
This table shows the results of the Fama and French (2015) five-factor regression for portfolios from 2002 to 2018 on a monthly basis. The 
regressions are calculated individually for each value-weighted portfolio based on a 10% cutoff of each score, market and portfolio set. The best 
(worst) portfolios consist of the 10% best (worst) rated companies regarding a particular score. The best–worst portfolios are long in the best-
performing companies and short in the worst-performing ones. Monthly alphas, all estimated coefficients of the five Fama and French (2015) 
factors and adj. R2 are reported upon. In order to estimate standard errors, we use the Newey and West (1987) procedure
***, ** and * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%
Alpha MKT SMB HML RMW CMA Adj. R2
Europe
 TR
  Best − 0.0028** 1.0161*** − 0.3915*** 0.3611*** 0.2073 − 0.1933 0.8690
  Worst − 0.0037 0.8806*** 0.4401* 0.2633 − 0.1965 − 0.0173 0.4343
  Best–worst − 0.0001 0.1373 − 0.8265*** 0.0868 0.4020 − 0.1711 0.0684
 Controversies
  Best 0.0019 0.9588*** − 0.0932 − 0.0545 0.4038*** 0.2531* 0.7984
  Worst − 0.0015 1.0022*** − 0.3708*** 0.2838** 0.2134 − 0.0585 0.8736
  Best–worst 0.0024 − 0.0415 0.2827*** − 0.3493*** 0.1885 0.3165** 0.1851
 Combined
  Best − 0.0040** 1.0891*** − 0.1922* 0.2496* 0.2226 0.0047 0.8218
  Worst − 0.0050 0.9880*** 0.2460 0.0022 − 0.3334 − 0.1350 0.5185
  Best–worst 0.0000 0.1030 − 0.4331* 0.2364 0.5543 0.1445 0.0108
USA
 TR
  Best − 0.0002 0.9763*** − 0.2039*** 0.2189*** − 0.0133 − 0.2165** 0.8199
  Worst 0.0016 1.0369*** 0.1796** 0.1176 − 0.0991 − 0.5176*** 0.7567
  Best–worst − 0.0028 − 0.0569 − 0.3817*** 0.0965 0.0889 0.3057** 0.1604
 Controversies
  Best 0.0017 0.9489*** 0.1649** 0.1628* 0.0511 − 0.3559*** 0.7433
  Worst − 0.0006 1.0348*** − 0.2573*** 0.2047*** − 0.0140 − 0.2468* 0.8289
  Best–worst 0.0012 − 0.0821 0.4239*** − 0.0467 0.0683 − 0.1044 0.1300
 Combined
  Best 0.0003 1.0341*** 0.1473** 0.1858** 0.1454 − 0.3361*** 0.8147
  Worst 0.0016 1.1014*** 0.0365 0.0755 − 0.1457 − 0.5575*** 0.7864
  Best–worst − 0.0023 − 0.0635 0.1126 0.1055 0.2942*** 0.2260* 0.0900
Global
 TR
  Best − 0.0009 1.0247*** − 0.3855*** 0.2376*** − 0.1266 − 0.1252 0.8919
  Worst 0.0013 0.9584*** 0.0214*** − 0.1020 − 0.0148 − 0.3126* 0.7645
  Best–worst − 0.0033* 0.0694 − 0.3971*** 0.3273*** − 0.1067 0.1957 0.1411
 Controversies
  Best 0.0033*** 0.8916*** 0.0007 − 0.0719 0.1870 − 0.1538 0.7969
  Worst 0.0002 1.0422*** − 0.4235*** 0.1572* − 0.1315 − 0.1250 0.8915
  Best–worst − 0.0021 − 0.1474*** 0.4340*** − 0.2414** 0.3236** − 0.0205 0.2313
 Combined
  Best − 0.0004 1.0376*** − 0.0670 0.1147 − 0.0622 − 0.2059* 0.8761
  Worst 0.0015 1.0261*** − 0.0456 − 0.2160* − 0.1146 − 0.3610** 0.8254
  Best–worst − 0.0030* 0.0145 − 0.0116 0.3183*** 0.0575 0.1633 0.0734
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Last but not least, the above observations also find their 
reflection in the combined score portfolios. On the one 
hand, the effect of the TR worst portfolios also occurs in the 
combined score worst portfolios, which are by definition 
strongly influenced by the TR score. On the other hand, it is 
not surprising that a slight decrease in the returns appears 
in these portfolios compared with corresponding TR worst 
portfolios, which can be explained due to the influence of 
the controversies score.
To discuss these results against the background of current 
literature, it is necessary to divide this step into two parts. 
As already published by previous studies such as Halbritter 
and Dorfleitner (2015), we confirm the recent observation, 
being that a market-weighted ESG strategy does not result 
in ongoing significant overperformance, so for this strategy, 
there is no clear out- or underperformance of best or worst 
portfolios.
The hypothesis of a positive relationship between the CSP 
and the CFP of a company (see, e.g., Kempf and Osthoff 
2007) could only partly be confirmed. Evidently, there is no 
performance loss when investing in ESG portfolios, but the 
data suggest that there is also no ongoing positive outper-
formance for companies with high ESG ratings, so for these 
portfolios, we strongly support the results of Revelli and 
Viviani (2015), being that neither weaknesses nor strengths 
can be detected for value-weighted positive CSP strategies.
However, this is reverted when considering equally 
weighted portfolios. Remarkably, no significant negative 
performance is detected when investing in best ESG port-
folios with an equally weighted strategy. Thus, there are no 
ESG-based performance losses for investors. Moreover, Stat-
man and Glushkov (2009) find that investors can achieve 
positive abnormal returns with socially responsible top-
minus-bottom strategies using equally weighted portfolios. 
Thus, in relation to the results of our best–worst portfolios, 
there is no reason for investors to pursue this strategy nowa-
days because, in particular, the worst portfolios based on the 
TR score reveal a significant overperformance. However, 
this also stands in contradiction to Auer (2016), who claims 
that investors should eliminate firms with the worst ESG 
ratings, whereas we find evidence of the fact that these rep-
resent some potential for (ESG neutral) investors. Moreover, 
this finding contradicts even Kempf and Osthoff (2007), who 
use a long-short strategy and obtain an overperformance. 
Contrary to this and related to our results, doing good while 
doing well did not manifest itself at all during our work.
Market efficientists would expect an immediate reaction 
on the stock market in the face of a controversy. Therefore, 
no long-term overperformance can be expected with regard 
to market-efficiency aspects, so it is surprising that there are 
several corresponding findings for the controversies score 
portfolios. Although the occurrences of controversies may 
be immediately priced by the market, which is indicated by 
the non-existing underperformance of the worst controver-
sies score portfolio, the absence of controversies appears to 
be incorrectly evaluated for small companies. The significant 
outperformance of the best-rated companies therefore indi-
cates a less efficient market regarding ESG-based informa-
tion as discussed by Edmans (2011), Mynhardt et al. (2017) 
and Dorfleitner et al. (2018). Smaller companies without an 
unwanted boost in public perception due to a controversy 
remain “silent saints” so-to-speak and “fly under the radar”. 
The controversies score enables a valuation of controversies 
that do not take place and may therefore be a good tool to 
enhance ESG investment as it reveals companies with a low 
amount of scandals with a specific potential for an increase 
in market value and stock price.
An additional consideration of the Fama and French fac-
tor coefficients yields some interesting insights regarding 
the differences between value and equally weighting. First, 
it can be seen that the market betas are generally around 1, 
but tend to be lower for value-weighted portfolios. This is 
not surprising, as smaller companies may have higher mar-
ket betas and these companies are represented with higher 
weights in the equally weighted portfolios. Second, we 
notice that the controversies best, TR worst and combined 
worst equally weighted portfolios have significant positive 
SMB
t
 factor coefficients and reveal a higher absolute value 
compared to the respective value-weighted portfolios, which 
is again explainable by the higher weights for smaller com-
panies. Third, the remaining factors show no systematically 
deviating patterns.
Portfolios based on market capitalization
To further investigate whether the observed strong overper-
formance of equally weighted portfolios with low TR ratings 
and high controversies scores is driven by company size, we 
divide our dataset at the median of the market capitalization 
and create new portfolios based on companies with high and 
low market capitalizations. Table 6 displays these portfo-
lios based on a 10% cutoff for the European, US and global 
markets. From this table, it is apparent that the main results 
remain consistent, namely a significant outperformance of 
portfolios based on small companies with low TR score rat-
ings as well as portfolios based on small companies with 
fewer controversies and therefore high controversies score.
It also can be seen from Table 6 that even the value-
weighted calculations based on firms with low market 
capitalization mostly show significant and positive alphas 
for controversies best, TR worst portfolios and ensure our 
results.
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Rank‑weighted portfolios
Table 7 displays best and worst rank-weighted portfolios 
based on a 10% cutoff for the European, US and global mar-
ket. When considering these portfolios, nearly all returns of 
the best and worst portfolios are higher than with the cor-
responding equally weighted strategies. Based on these cal-
culations, the returns improve by up to 42.86%7 for the best, 
by up to 32.24%8 for the worst and by up to 84.28%9 for the 
best-minus-worst portfolios, compared with the correspond-
ing equally weighted portfolios. Note that rank-weighted 
portfolios also reveal a lower significance level in terms of 
p values, which indicates a real potential for investors.
On the one hand, there are a number of promising invest-
ment strategies for investors who strongly attach importance 
to ESG scores. As we previously mentioned, the controver-
sies score represents a huge potential for investors in particu-
lar, and together with a rank-weighted portfolio strategy the 
corresponding alphas even increase, so this score describes 
a way in which to detect companies with a specific man-
agement culture that apparently leads to higher future cash 
flows and therefore to higher and more significant alphas. 
Surprisingly, companies with a high controversies score 
do not necessarily have a high ESG score. This noteworthy 
observation remains open for future research.
On the other hand, investors pursuing exactly the opposite 
strategy also benefit from rank weighting portfolios. This is 
particularly evident in the outperformance of the TR worst 
portfolios. Obviously, stronger weightings for firms with 
very low TR scores lead to significant overperformance, 
which can be traced back to a trade-off interpretation (see 
Aupperle et al. 1985). In summary, one can conclude that the 
rank weighting portfolios represent a useful tool for investors 
who wish to profit from ESG ratings either by investing in 
high-ranked companies or by investing in low-ranked firms. 
Finally, to put it in a nutshell: buy the “saints” or invest in 
the “small sinners”.
Robustness checks
To check our results for robustness, we run some further 
regressions. First of all, we construct the equally weighted 
portfolios based on the 20% (instead of 10%) best and worst 
companies. Again we use the Fama and French (2015) five-
factor regression model. The results are presented in Table 8 
and indicate that all previous results remain materially the 
same for the 20% equally weighted selection, i.e., an out-
performance of the controversies score best and the TR and 
combined score worst portfolios.
Moreover, with regard to the rank-weighted strategy, 
the 20% portfolios are also examined. Following the same 
Table 7  Rank-weighted 10% 
portfolios: regressions based on 
the three observed markets
This table shows the results of the Fama and French (2015) five-factor regression for portfolios from 2002 
to 2018 on a monthly basis. The regressions are calculated individually for each rank-weighted portfo-
lio based on a 10% cutoff of each score, market and portfolio set. The best (worst) portfolios consist of 
the 10% best (worst) rated companies regarding a particular score. The best–worst portfolios are long in 
the best-performing companies and short in the worst-performing ones. Monthly alphas and adj. R2 are 
reported upon. In order to estimate standard errors, we use the Newey and West (1987) procedure
***, ** and * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%
Europe USA Global
Alpha Adj. R2 Alpha Adj. R2 Alpha Adj. R2
TR
 Best 0.0020 0.8718 0.0017 0.7899 0.0022 0.8918
 Worst 0.0057*** 0.8716 0.0047** 0.8189 0.0077*** 0.8502
 Best–worst − 0.0047*** 0.3329 − 0.0040*** 0.3344 − 0.0065*** 0.1627
Controversies
 Best 0.0064*** 0.8575 0.0062*** 0.7957 0.0079*** 0.8777
 Worst 0.0031* 0.8541 0.0014 0.8216 0.0027 0.8667
 Best–worst 0.0023 0.3216 0.0038** 0.2049 0.0042*** 0.2429
Combined
 Best 0.0010 0.8761 0.0017 0.8177 0.0018 0.9021
 Worst 0.0046** 0.8436 0.0040* 0.8163 0.0063*** 0.8515
 Best–worst − 0.0045** 0.2231 − 0.0033*** 0.1522 − 0.0056*** 0.0992
7 This displays the improvement in annual returns from 0.0693 to 
0.0990 of the global controversies best portfolio.
8 This displays the improvement in annual returns from 0.0428 to 
0.0566 of the Europe combined worst portfolio.
9 This displays the improvement in annual returns from 0.0280 to 
0.0516 of the global controversies best–worst portfolio.
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procedure, this leads to the results displayed in Table 9. 
Also, in this case, all results of previous calculations 
remain approximately unchanged. Compared with the 20% 
equally weighted portfolios, most of the alphas are higher. 
For instance, we can observe an almost 20% increase in the 
alpha of the controversies best portfolio in the global market 
from 0.0046 to 0.0055, both being significant at a 1 % level.
As a next step, we divide our portfolios into bull and 
bear market periods to monitor how the portfolio strategies 
perform in different market phases. The results are shown in 
Table 10. The data suggest that the majority of the strategies 
work in bull markets. Moreover, one argument against this 
cannot be ignored: In our investigation period, there were 
mostly bullish phases and only a few bearish time periods, 
Table 8  Equally weighted 20% 
portfolios: regressions based on 
the three observed markets
This table shows the results of the Fama and French (2015) five-factor regression for portfolios from 2002 
to 2018 on a monthly basis. The regressions are calculated individually for each equally weighted port-
folio based on a 20% cutoff of each score, market and portfolio set. The best (worst) portfolios consist of 
the 20% best (worst) rated companies regarding a particular score. The best–worst portfolios are long in 
the best-performing companies and short in the worst-performing ones. Monthly alphas and adj. R2 are 
reported upon. In order to estimate standard errors, we use the Newey and West (1987) procedure
***, ** and * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%
Europe USA Global
Alpha Adj. R2 Alpha Adj. R2 Alpha Adj. R2
TR
 Best 0.0014 0.8956 0.0020 0.8297 0.0023* 0.9044
 Worst 0.0043** 0.8871 0.0041** 0.8549 0.0059*** 0.8804
 Best–worst − 0.0039*** 0.4758 − 0.0031*** 0.4006 − 0.0046*** 0.2167
Controversies
 Best 0.0051*** 0.8952 0.0038** 0.8102 0.0046*** 0.8780
 Worst 0.0018 0.8854 0.0017 0.8279 0.0021 0.8854
 Best–worst 0.0024** 0.274 0.0011 0.0577 0.0015 0.1443
Combined
 Best 0.0020 0.8860 0.0023 0.8226 0.0026* 0.9103
 Worst 0.0030* 0.8864 0.0030** 0.8549 0.0053*** 0.8850
 Best–worst − 0.0019* 0.2459 − 0.0018** 0.0850 − 0.0038*** 0.0920
Table 9  Rank-weighted 20% 
portfolios: regressions based on 
the three observed markets
This table shows the results of the Fama and French (2015) five-factor regression for portfolios from 2002 
to 2018 on a monthly basis. The regressions are calculated individually for each rank-weighted portfo-
lio based on a 20% cutoff of each score, market and portfolio set. The best (worst) portfolios consist of 
the 20% best (worst) rated companies regarding a particular score. The best–worst portfolios are long in 
the best-performing companies and short in the worst-performing ones. Monthly alphas and adj. R2 are 
reported upon. In order to estimate standard errors, we use the Newey and West (1987) procedure
***, ** and * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%
Europe USA Global
Alpha Adj. R2 Alpha Adj. R2 Alpha Adj. R2
TR
 Best 0.0018 0.8884 0.0016 0.8214 0.0024* 0.9012
 Worst 0.0049*** 0.8853 0.0041** 0.8455 0.0069*** 0.8728
 Best–worst − 0.0042*** 0.4182 − 0.0035*** 0.4105 − 0.0056*** 0.1868
Controversies
 Best 0.0053*** 0.8838 0.0046** 0.8128 0.0057*** 0.8789
 Worst 0.0022 0.8772 0.0016 0.8311 0.0022 0.8804
 Best–worst 0.0021* 0.3409 0.0020 0.1333 0.0025** 0.2523
Combined
 Best 0.0015 0.8831 0.0022 0.8184 0.0023* 0.9056
 Worst 0.0041** 0.8738 0.0036** 0.8416 0.0058*** 0.8729
 Best–worst − 0.0036*** 0.2667 − 0.0025*** 0.1275 − 0.0045*** 0.1019
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those of which are comparatively short. Since we are nev-
ertheless also able to detect a number of positive significant 
results in bearish market phases, for example, the best con-
troversies portfolio in the US market or most portfolios in 
the global market, this points to the fact that the strategies 
are robust against various market movements.
Furthermore, we split our portfolios up into two subpe-
riods (Table 11). The first subperiod dates from April 2002 
to March 2010 and the second from April 2010 until April 
2018. The findings show for the US and global portfolios 
in particular that the abnormal returns are maintained even 
under this sample split. Eventually, we also check the results 
for a winsorization of the returns at the 1% level and re-run 
all regressions. The results remained unchanged.
In addition, we also construct equally and value-weighted 
portfolios based on 20% (instead of 10%) best and worst 
companies with high and low market capitalization. The 
results of these regressions are displayed in Table 12. All 
previous major results remain materially unchanged for the 
20% portfolios.
In order to include transaction costs, it is necessary to 
account for the turnover rate of the considered portfolios. 
For the 10% cutoff and US portfolios, we observe an aver-
age monthly turnover of 6.74% for the best TR and 8.55% for 
the worst TR, respectively 11.82% and 9.15% for the contro-
versies score, as well as 8.84% and 9.69% for the combined 
score portfolios. This remains on an equal level for the other 
markets under review, so that the average monthly turnover 
rate stands at approximately 10%. Even for all other cutoffs, 
the turnover rate is materially the same. Thus, in line with 
Frazzini et al. (2018), the results of these portfolio strategies 
lead to expected annual trading costs between 90 and 150 
bps, which implies that the significant alphas remain positive 
even after transaction costs.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examine a dataset that includes over 4700 
companies and the associated TR, controversies and com-
bined scores in the Thomson Reuters Eikon universe in the 
investigation period from 2002 to 2018. All calculations are 
performed for the European, US and global markets. This 
paper is the first one investigating positive screened port-
folios dependent on the controversies score, which meas-
ures the amount of ESG-based controversies a company 
has faced. The calculations based on the Fama and French 
(2015) five-factor model show that there is still potential for 
an investor to achieve a significant outperformance. Even 
though a value-weighted investing strategy does not show 
any significant over- or underperformance and therefore con-
firms many of the previous literature findings (see Halbritter 
and Dorfleitner 2015), we can find some noteworthy results.
First of all, the inclusion of the controversies score in an 
ESG-based portfolio selection approach enables for a sim-
ple implementation as a way to quantify and evaluate the 
absence of a certain event, namely an ESG-based scandal, 
which might help to improve the information efficiency of 
the market with regard to the absence of these. Furthermore, 
from an investor’s standpoint, having a “clean coat” with 
regard to controversies is especially profitable for smaller 
companies, as the absence of these scandals may be over-
looked and incorrectly incorporated in the market prices. 
Thus, one might say that the respective companies “fly under 
the radar”.
In addition, equally weighted portfolio strategies based 
on worst TR and combined scores show significant outper-
formance, which leads to the conclusion that for the respec-
tive (small) companies there are indications in favor of the 
trade-off theory. Moreover, the results hold true for various 
robustness checks such as the variation of cutoff levels or 
the splitting of the period under review. Besides the two 
standard approaches in the context of portfolio formation, 
namely value- and equally weighting, we discover new 
potential in the rank-weighted strategy for investors, which 
leads to improvements in terms of both, alpha and level of 
significance, within most of the investigated portfolios. For 
investors who attach great importance to ESG ratings, this 
represents an enormous opportunity to reward better scoring 
placements of companies and additionally to gain higher 
returns.
In light of these findings, it must, however, still be consid-
ered that there are hidden opportunities for investors that can 
be exploited in order to benefit from ESG-based ratings. The 
empirical results and arguments provided above prove that it 
is worth remaining vigilant concerning this issue.
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